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Abstract  
This study conducts a comparison analysis on the efficiency of bookbuilding and secondary market 
proportional offering (hereafter, SMP offering) in the China stock market. SMP offering as described in 
this paper is not a follow-on offering, but an initial offering applicable to investors in the secondary market. 
Specifically, as a unique type of fixed price offering, SMP offering only allows the existing investors who 
are holding shares (of any listed firms) in the secondary market to subscribe to IPO shares. The amount of 
IPO shares available to be subscribed by the existing investors is proportional to market value of shares 
held by them in the secondary market. We find some interesting evidence showing that, compared with 
bookbuilding, SMP offering is more efficient for pricing IPOs, particularly, in a volatile market. SMP 
offering leads to lower underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of short-run returns of IPOs. Also, 
SMP offering is better able to counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market return and/or 
high market volatility. Our results are robust to various alternative tests, e.g., the Heckman (1979) two-
stage procedure and an out-of-sample test, after controlling for the problem of endogeneity and for the 
influence of the exchange of listing, respectively. 
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A substantial body of evidence indicates that there is a tendency for initial public offerings (IPOs) to appear 
underpriced on the first day of trading (see recent reviews in Ritter and Welch 2002; Ritter 2003; Ljungqvist 
2007).1 It has been widely argued that a deeper understanding of the role of issuing mechanisms might help 
inform aspects of the unsolved puzzle of IPO underpricing. An appropriate choice and deployment of 
issuing mechanisms might ameliorate the impact of information asymmetry between issuers and investors 
(Neupane and Poshakwale 2012). Ritter (2002) summarizes three principal types of globally employed 
issuing mechanisms: auction, bookbuilding, and fixed price offerings, which differ mainly in price 
discovery and share allocation process. The seminal study of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argues that 
bookbuilding can lead to more efficient price discovery as it allows underwriters to determine at what price 
to offer an IPO based on the demand from institutional investors. Numerous subsequent studies show that 
bookbuilding is associated with a lower level of IPO underpricing (see Benveniste and Wihelm 1990; 
Sherman 2000). Although bookbuilding is becoming increasingly dominant worldwide and estimated to 
account for over 80% of IPOs outside the US and Canada (Ljungqvist et al. 2003), international evidence 
on the efficiency of bookbuilding is rather mixed, showing that the choice of issuing mechanisms and the 
level of underpricing vary across markets. For example, in contrast to the conventional viewpoint, Busaba 
and Chang (2010) argue that, on average, fixed price offering produces higher expected proceeds, unless 
the underwriter can target its bookbuilding to a small subset of informed investors. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) 
empirically examine a sample of 2,143 IPOs in 65 stock markets outside the US in the 1990s. They report 
an average underpricing of around 20% for fixed price offerings (close to that for IPOs using bookbuilding), 
implying that fixed price offering still remains an efficient, low cost way to distribute IPO shares. Degeorge 
et al. (2010) also suggest that auction can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.2  
In contributing to this debate, this study sheds additional light on the efficiency of issuing 
mechanisms for pricing IPOs in the China stock market, which has experienced tremendous development 
in IPO activities in the last two decades. Our particular attention on the China stock market is motivated by 
the following considerations. First, there exist several basic and substantially different issuing mechanisms 
in the China stock market, such as auction, bookbuilding, and various types of fixed price offering, 
including online fixed price offering, secondary market proportional offering (hereafter, SMP offering), 
and bookbuilding plus SMP offering, etc. The China stock market, therefore, offers an ideal arena to address 
the challenging question of which issuing mechanism is more efficient for pricing IPOs in a single-country 
context. In particular, SMP offering as described in this paper is not a follow-on offering (or a dilutive 
                                                          
1 A routinely updated Table 1 in Loughran et al. (1994) presents comprehensive evidence on the level of IPO underpricing 
worldwide (Available at: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2017/05/IPOs2016Underpricing.pdf).  
2 Jagannathan et al. (2015) conduct a comparative review of the three most common types of IPO issuing mechanisms in 47 
international markets and provide potential explanations on why auction is unpopular in most markets. We note, but do not explore, 
the existence of numerous studies on the efficiency of auction-related issuing mechanisms (see Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; 
Derrien and Womack 2003; Sherman 2005; Lowry et al. 2010). 
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secondary offering), 3  but an initial offering applicable to investors in the secondary market. The 
distinguishing feature of SMP offering is that it only allows the existing investors who are holding shares 
(of any listed firms) in the secondary market to subscribe to IPO shares. The right to buy IPO shares depends 
on whether investors are holding shares in the secondary market, while the amount of IPO shares available 
to be subscribed by the existing investors is proportional to market value of shares held by them.  
Furthermore, although the China stock market has become one of the largest and most important 
emerging markets in the world, its institutional settings and trading practices are relatively new and, in part, 
different from and independent of those in developed markets. For example, the dominance of individual 
investors, the existence of a majority of non-tradable shares (or the split-share structure), and the long gap 
between the offering and listing dates for IPOs have been extensively criticized as an indicator of 
bureaucratic control, operating inefficiency, and severe information asymmetry (Chan et al. 2004). As a 
result, it takes longer for any information to be fully reflected in asset prices, which can cause the role of 
issuing mechanisms in emerging markets to be distinct from that in developed markets.  
As a transitional institutional setting, SMP offering was built on the existence of the split-share 
structure in the China stock market. The primary purpose of the implementation of SMP offering is to 
reduce the IPO subscription costs for investors in the secondary market. With the formal launch of the split-
share structure reform in 2005, non-tradable shares were gradually converted into tradable shares and the 
foundation of SMP offering no longer existed (see details on related institutional background in Subsection 
2.1). Accordingly, a milestone document––Circular on Several Issues Concerning on the Trial 
Implementation of an Inquiry System for Initial Public Offering of Shares (No. 162 [2004]; hereafter, The 
Regulation 2004)––was issued by the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) on December 7th, 
2004 and effective as of January 1st, 2005, marking the establishment of a market-oriented issuing 
mechanism (bookbuilding) to increase the efficiency for marketing and pricing IPOs in the China stock 
market. Such institutional reform, however, may make previous empirical models inadequate to effectively 
explain IPO pricing behavior in the China stock market, without taking the role of issuing mechanisms into 
account. 
Indeed, although the severe level of IPO underpricing in the China stock market has been well 
reported (see Mok and Hui 1998; Chan et al. 2004), previous studies pay little attention to the explanatory 
power of issuing mechanisms. Yong (2007) conducts a comprehensive review of research on Asian IPOs 
and points out that this research area is still lacking and worth looking into. A recent study of Ma and Faff 
(2007) examines an early sample of 942 Chinese IPOs issued over the period 1994 to 2003 and supports 
the idea that bookbuilding increases pricing accuracy and is optimal in counteracting adverse market 
conditions. However, given the chosen sample period, they compare a very limited sample of 51 IPOs using 
bookbuilding with 891 fixed price offerings, making their empirical results somewhat unrepresentative. 
                                                          
3 In a follow-on offering, the listed firm itself issues additional shares on the primary market after the initial offering, thus diluting 
the existing shares. 
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Guo and Brooks (2008) also account for various issuing mechanisms in the China stock market before 2005, 
but their sample does not include any IPOs using bookbuiding. 
This study comparatively examines the efficiency of various issuing mechanisms using a more recent 
sample of 523 IPOs in the China stock market over the period April 2001 to September 2008. We also 
include an out-of-sample of 90 IPOs issued over the period July 2009 to October 2012 for robustness 
analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study focusing on a comparison of the efficiency of 
bookbuilding and SMP offering (a dominant fixed price offering) in the China stock market. The primary 
objective of this study is to test two criteria proposed by Derrien and Womack (2003) for assessing the 
efficiency of IPO issuing mechanisms. That is, an efficient issuing mechanism is able to (i) lead to lower 
underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of initial returns, and (ii) counteract adverse market 
conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility. This study provides some 
interesting evidence to complement the existing finance literature, and has important relevance to market 
participants and financial regulators.  
First, we find a mean market-adjusted initial return of 95.16% for IPOs over the period 2001 to 2005, 
which is relatively lower than the well-known severe level of underpricing during the 1990s. For example, 
Zhou and Zhou (2010) examine 1,380 A-share IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005 and report an average 
underpricing of 238% (see also Mok and Hui 1998; Chan et al. 2004). However, the comparatively modest 
level of IPO underpricing observed from 2001 to 2005 does not persist in the subsequent period, as we find 
a mean market-adjusted initial return of 146.84% over the period 2006 to 2008 that reaches 202.50% in 
2007. We conjecture that the rebound of the substantial IPO underpricing after 2005 could be due to the 
change in market conditions. A formal test confirms that market conditions in terms of market return and 
volatility have significantly positive impacts on the level of IPO underpricing.  
In addition, market practitioners generally suggest that the typical aim of underwriters is not only to 
underprice, but to control aftermarket price variations, especially on the downside (Derrien and Womack 
2003). Inferring from this, we would expect that an efficient issuing mechanism is reflected in both lower 
underpricing and lower variance proxied by the cross-sectional squared deviations of IPO underpricing. 
We are not aware of any previous study that examines the impact of market conditions on the variance of 
IPO underpricing in an emerging market context. We find that market conditions in terms of market return 
and volatility have significantly positive impacts on the variance of short-run returns of IPOs.  
Finally, the most important finding of this study is that, compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering 
is associated with greater efficiency for pricing IPOs, in particular, in the face of adverse market return and 
volatility. It could be due to the fact that SMP offering makes the secondary market existing investors as 
signal conduits because of their experience of firm performance in different market conditions. These 
experienced investors have phenomenal knowledge of share ownership of issuers in the stock market and 
are better able to deal with noisy signals; this is not necessarily the case for bookbuilding. In this way, the 
behavior of these secondary market existing investors could be intentionally followed by less-informed 
investors in making decisions concerning potential IPO investment. Therefore, the quality of signals is 
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better in SMP offering (see more discussions in Subsection 2.2). Our results are robust to various alternative 
tests, e.g., the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure and an out-of-sample test, after controlling for the 
problem of endogeneity and for the influence of the exchange of listing, respectively. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces relevant 
institutional background in the China stock market and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and 
sample statistics, while Section 4 presents empirical results, followed by various robustness tests in Section 
5. The final section concludes this paper. 
2 Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Institutional background 
IPO issuing mechanisms in the China stock market have undergone significant changes since the early 
1990s. Before the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was inaugurated in December 1990 and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) was opened in April 1991, a number of firms issued IPO shares by private 
placement to employees and local public, without the participation of underwriters. With the establishment 
of both stock exchanges, IPO issuing mechanisms were characterized by the limited subscription warrants, 
which were soon replaced by the unlimited subscription warrants in 1992.  
Since 1994, several types of fixed price offering have become increasingly popular, such as online 
fixed price offering, SMP offering, as well as online fixed price plus SMP offering, etc. For example, online 
fixed price offering sets a fixed offering price and allocates IPO shares using the lottery drawing through 
an electronic trading system.4 In contrast, SMP offering requires IPO shares to be sold to subscribers who 
have already held shares in the secondary market with a proportion on the basis of market value of shares 
held by these investors. That is, SMP offering only allows the existing investors who hold shares in the 
secondary market to subscribe to IPO shares; the amount of IPO shares available to the existing investors 
is proportional to market value of shares held by them in the secondary market.  
An innovated SMP offering allocates IPO shares to existing individual investors proportionally to 
market value of their shares in the secondary market through an electronic trading system, and to 
institutional investors proportionally to their subscriptions over the counter. To direct more investors to the 
secondary market, the CSRC published Circular on Relevant Issues Concerning the Issue of New Shares 
to Investors in the Secondary Market (No. 5 [2000]) on February 13th, 2000, allowing half of IPO shares 
to be allocated to the existing secondary market investors. In 2000, 35 IPOs adopted this issuing mechanism 
until it ceased operation after 2000 because of technical problems. On May 20th, 2002, the CSRC published 
Supplementary Circular on Relevant Issues Concerning the Issue of New Shares to Investors in the 
                                                          
4 As required by the CSRC, the offering price is based on the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio and the forecasted earnings per share 
(EPS): the offering price = P/E × the forecasted EPS, where the P/E ratio was initially fixed at 15. There were substantial changes 
in the measurements of EPS. For example, on December 26th, 1996, the CSRC changed the measurement of EPS based on the 
realized arithmetic average EPS in the past three years: EPSt = (the realized EPSt–3 + the realized EPSt–2 + the realized EPSt–1)/3. 
The CSRC adjusted the measurement of EPS again on September 10th, 1997, based on the weighted average of the realized EPS 
in the year before the IPO and the forecasted EPS during the IPO year: EPSt = 0.7 × the realized EPSt–1 + 0.3 × the forecasted EPSt. 
On March 17th, 1998, the CSRC again changed the measurement of EPS back to the forecasted EPS: EPS = forecasted 




Secondary Market (No. 54 [2002]) to resume SMP offering and adjusted the percentage of IPO shares that 
could be allocated to the secondary market existing investors from 50% to 100%. 
As a transitional institutional setting, SMP offering was built on the existence of the split-share 
structure in the China stock market,5 in attempts to reduce the IPO subscription costs for investors in the 
secondary market. However, with the formal launch of the split-share structure reform in 2005,6 non-
tradable shares were gradually converted into tradable shares; the foundation of SMP offering thus no 
longer existed. With the release of Circular on Further Improving Methods of Issuing Shares (No. 94 [1999]) 
by the CSRC on July 28th, 1999, bookbuilding was first introduced to the China stock market, allowing 
issuers and leading underwriters to set an initial offering price range and to determine the final offering 
price after a series of consultations with institutional investors. The final offering price is still subject to 
approval from the CSRC, especially if the recommended price is not within the suggested range of the P/E 
ratio.7 Although the experimental bookbuilding was only applied to issuers with the IPO size of more than 
RMB 400 million, this was a signal that the China stock market made strides towards a market-oriented 
issuing mechanism to increase the efficiency for marketing and pricing IPOs. A total of 31 IPOs (3 in 1999 
and 28 in 2000) employed bookbuilding before it was suspended in late 2000. Since its restoration on 
November 6th, 2001, bookbuilding was generally employed by IPOs issued in 2001 and in the first five 
months of 2002 until the CSRC required issuers to allocate IPO shares to the secondary market existing 
investors in May 2002. 
Despite the frequent changes in IPO issuing mechanisms,8 fixed price offering predominated the 
China stock market until The Regulation 2004 was implemented on January 1st, 2005, along with its 
accompanying document––Memorandum No. 18 of Approval Standards on Share Issuance: Regulatory 
                                                          
5 The ownership structure of firms listed in the China stock market has some unique features. For example, most listed firms are 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a majority of shares are non-tradable shares, owned by the government and/or other legal 
entities. Specifically, the ordinary shares of a typical listed firm in the China stock market can be classified into two categories: 
tradable shares and non-tradable shares, which is also referred to as the split-share structure. Tradable shares include A-shares and 
B-shares traded either on the SHSE or on the SZSE, while non-tradable shares include: (i) state-owned shares held by state 
authorized investment departments or institutions with state assets; (ii) state-owned legal person shares held by other state-owned 
enterprises; (iii) legal person shares held by corporate enterprises or public institutions and social bodies; and (iv) employee shares 
held by employees and initially prohibited from trading for a certain time period until they become tradable.  
6 The CSRC released Circular on Issues Relating to the Pilot Reform of Listed Companies Split Share on April 29, 2005 (No. 32 
[2005]), marking the launch of the first phase of its split-share structure reform by inviting four listed firms to convert their non-
tradable shares into tradable shares. On September 5, 2005, the CSRC issued the first official document––Administrative Measures 
on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (No. 86 [2005]), providing guidelines on the implementation of the split-
share structure reform. 
7 As the China stock market was at an early development stage, neither institutional nor individual investors were able to determine 
the value of an issuer, resulting in some overheated IPOs with very high offering P/E ratios in 2000. For example, Fujian Mindong 
Electric Power Co., Ltd. (000993) went public on the SZSE with a record high P/E ratio of 88.69 on July 31st, 2000. To cool down 
the overheated IPOs with excessively high P/E ratios, on July 1st, 2001, the CSRC introduced an upper limit on the P/E ratio of 20, 
which was lifted in 2005, though, in practice, the CSRC did not approve IPOs with a P/E ratio of greater than 30. 
8 Several experimental auction mechanisms were implemented in 1994 and 1995. Specifically, issuers and underwriters set an 
initial price and investors were required to bid for both price and quantity. The final offering price was set at the level where the 
accumulative quantities demanded by investors were equal to the total number of new shares available. However, only four IPOs 
issued between June 1994 and January 1995 employed this auction mechanism. Furthermore, two pro rata mechanisms were 
introduced by the CSRC on December 16th, 1996. Investors were required to save enough money to subscribe to IPO shares in 
special accounts, and IPO shares were allocated pro rata in case of over-subscription. The two pro rata mechanisms were widely 
adopted in 1996 and 1997, but were never used after 1998. A summary description of relevant issuing mechanisms employed in 
the China stock market over the period from 1994 to 2003 is presented in Ma and Faff (2007). 
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Requirements Applicable to Institutions Participating in the Bookbuilding Process. An updated 
bookbuilding was designed by the CRSC to attract more institutional investors to the pricing process. 
Specifically, bookbuilding contains a preliminary inquiry session and a following cumulative bidding 
inquiry session, or road show session. The issuer and its nominated advisor (usually its leading underwriter) 
first file for registration with the CSRC and then hand in the due diligence report. Once the registration is 
approved by the CSRC, the report is delivered to a number of qualified institutional investors (no less than 
20 selected by the underwriter) who participate in the preliminary inquiry session to conduct the price 
consultation until the offering price range is settled. The leading underwriter then organizes the road show 
campaigns, accumulates bid volumes from all qualified institutional investors within the offering price 
range, sets the offering price according to market demands, and finally allocates IPO shares according to 
the bid size. The qualified institutional investors include securities investment and fund management firms, 
securities firms, trust and investment firms, financial firms, insurance institutional investors, qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFII), and other institutional investors approved by the CSRC. 
On September 11th, 2006, the CSRC published Administrative Measures on Securities Issuance and 
Underwriting (No. 37 [2006]; hereafter The Measure 2006), stipulating that IPO shares could be allocated 
to strategic investors if the IPO size is RMB 400 million or more; strategic investors must hold these shares 
for at least 12 months as committed. Also, the number of IPO shares allocated to qualified institutional 
investors should not exceed 20% of the total IPO size if the IPO size is less than RMB 400 million, while 
the number of IPO shares allocated to qualified institutional investors should not exceed 50% of the total 
IPO size if the IPO size is RMB 400 million or more; the qualified institutional investors must hold these 
shares for at least three months as committed. 
In order to further enhance the efficiency of the bookbuilding process, the CSRC formulated 
Guidance on Further Reforming and Improving New Issue Process (No. 13 [2009]) on June 10th, 2009, 
providing leading underwriters with complete freedom to determine the offering price. For example, an 
elimination system was introduced in the preliminary inquiry session, that is, investors who fail to make 
valid bids in the preliminary inquiry session are not eligible to participate in the following cumulative 
bidding inquiry session. In addition, institutions that have made valid bids in the preliminary inquiry session 
have to participate in the following cumulative bidding inquiry session and complete subscriptions, 
preventing those investors from making overpriced subscriptions but then default. Furthermore, the total 
subscription volumes made in the cumulative bidding inquiry session must be no less than those planned 
in the preliminary inquiry session. Since then, the preliminary price inquiry has become a key element in 
the bookbuilding process, marking the establishment of a more market-oriented issuing mechanism in the 
China stock market (see Deng and Zhou 2016). 
In accordance with the unified arrangements on reforming IPO issuing mechanism, the CSRC 
formulated Guidance on Further Reforming New Share Issuance (No. 26 [2010]) on October 11th, 2010, 
allowing both institutional and experienced individual investors to participate in the preliminary inquiry 
session and subsequent share allocation process. Also, the CSRC made a series of amendments on The 
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Measure 2006 (see e.g. No. 69 [2010 Revision] on October 11th, 2010; No. 78 [2012 Revision] on May 
18th, 2012; No. 95 [2013 Revision] on December 13th, 2013; No. 98 [2014 Revision] on March 21st, 2014; 
No. 121 [2015 Revision] on December 30th, 2015). For example, the three-month holding period for 
qualified institutional investors was abolished. Instead, issuers, leading underwriters, and institutional 
investors may agree on a minimum holding period of IPO shares on their own. After prospectuses are 
published, issuers and leading underwriters may communicate with certain institutions non-publicly and 
learn about their pricing intentions, to make predictions about the offering price range; other legal and 
feasible approaches may also be employed. Issuers and leading underwriters may directly set the final 
offering price according to the consultations in the preliminary inquiry session; alternatively, they may set 
the offering price range through the preliminary inquiry session and then determine the final offering price 
(within the offering price range) in the cumulative bidding inquiry session. 
2.2 Hypothesis development  
Theoretical work in explaining IPO underpricing always assumes that market participants are rational and 
the objective of issuers is to maximize the funds raised in a given market condition and market structure in 
the knowledge that there exist heterogeneous investor groups (see Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; Ritter 
and Welch 2002; Kennedy et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006). As noted by Sherman and Titman (2002), 
information asymmetry has a substantial impact on the accuracy of the IPO pricing process. Specifically, it 
should be more difficult to estimate accurately the value of an issuer in a volatile market, which gives rise 
to the potential emergence of more severe information asymmetry.9 Rock (1986) predicts that, on average, 
issuers characterized by more severe information asymmetry tend to be more underpriced, a prediction that 
has received considerable empirical support (see Kennedy et al. 2006). 
Bookbuilding is a systematic process by which an underwriter (investment bank) appointed by the 
issuer attempts to determine the offering price of an IPO based on the demand from institutional investors. 
The traditional viewpoint generally argues that bookbuilding can lead to more efficient price discovery and 
less severe information asymmetry, due to its advantage in information collection and the full discretion of 
share allocation by underwriters (see Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Benveniste and Wihelm 1990; Sherman 
2000). It is expected that underwriters, as financial intermediaries in the new issue market, play an important 
role as information producers to reduce information asymmetry surrounding issuers. However, some 
evidence from regulatory settlements and the financial press highlights the difficulty of underwriters in 
accurately pricing IPOs during the share allocation process. For example, during the road show session, the 
process of promoting an IPO firm to institutional investors fails to resolve much of the uncertainty in the 
market, probably because underwriters have allocated more underpriced IPOs to institutional investors who 
can pay large brokerage commissions (see Binay et al. 2007). Moreover, Krigman et al. (2001) and Houston 
et al. (2006) argue that price discovery is not the only service provided by underwriters, and accurate price 
discovery may not always be their primary objective. In fact, underwriters make more efforts in the 
                                                          
9 Lowry et al. (2010) argue that, in a volatile market, a higher level of underpricing is expected to compensate investors for their 
greater costs of becoming informed and a higher variance of initial returns is expected because it is difficult for investors to estimate 
the value of the issuer. 
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provision of auxiliary services, such as price support, market making, and analyst coverage, etc., rather than 
striving to minimize pricing errors in the IPO process. Many issuers thus place a very high value on 
underwriters’ ability in order to guarantee certain post-IPO services. This might explain the dominance of 
bookbuilding worldwide despite its lack of accurate price discovery (see Ljungqvist et al. 2003; Lowry et 
al. 2010).  
In addition, the available evidence casts doubts on bookbuilding as an efficient issuing mechanism 
of conveying public information, that is, public information seems not be fully incorporated into the 
offering price when the role of heterogeneous investor groups is recognized and information asymmetry 
emerges (see Bradley and Jordan 2002; Loughran and Ritter 2002; Lowry and Schwert 2004). In particular, 
when the market is volatile and signals are noisy, then the impact of information flows on different investor 
groups becomes blurred, we could expect the IPO price distribution to be wider and underpricing to grow 
faster than that observed under a benign market condition (Beatty and Ritter 1986). In this type of situation, 
the price-based market mechanism cannot ex ante fully resolve uncertainty relating even to public 
information; investors naturally then look to non-price information signals and one approach is for less-
informed investors to rely more heavily on the purchasing action of informed investors.10 This is a type of 
information cascades in which investors infer relevant information from the observed behavior of those 
presumed to hold superior information in the market (Ritter and Welch 2002).  
It is in this context that SMP offering has an advantage in a more efficient manner, because SMP 
offering targets an investment community––the existing investors who are holding shares in the secondary 
market. Specifically, SMP offering requires IPO shares to be sold only to investors who have already held 
shares (of any listed firm) in the secondary market. SMP offering makes these existing investors in the 
secondary market as signal conduits, as they have plenty of experience of firm performance in the stock 
market from their ownership of shares over a period of time, and thus are better able to deal with noisy 
signals and discern how issuers will perform in different market conditions; this is not necessarily the case 
for bookbuilding. In this way, less-informed investors ignore their own noisy information and intentionally 
follow the observed behavior of secondary market existing investors in making decisions concerning 
potential IPO investment. Therefore, SMP offering is expected to more effectively reduce the level of 
information asymmetry and potentially contribute to more accurate price discovery. 
Derrien and Womack (2003) argue that underwriters aim not only to underprice, but also to control 
aftermarket price variations. Lowry et al. (2010) propose a new metric for evaluating the pricing of IPOs–
–the volatility of initial returns, which is positively related to the level of underpricing. Inferring from this 
argument and according to the above discussions, we test the following two main hypotheses: 
                                                          
10 Loughran et al. (1994) argue that, under information asymmetry, the existing shareholders and managers have information 
advantages over prospective investors in regard to the issuer, as prospective investors rely primarily on financial statements in the 
prospectuses, which are supposed to be presented in a favorable manner. That is, issuers might boost earnings relative to cash flows 
before the IPO and the profitability declines after the IPO. Therefore, prospective investors cannot effectively identify the quality 
of issuers, leading to an adverse selection problem, and eventually a lemon market (Beatty and Ritter 1986; Rock 1986; Balvers et 
al. 1993; Mantell 2016). 
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H1: Compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is more capable of leading to lower 
underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of initial returns;  
H2: Compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is more capable of counteracting adverse 
market conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility. 
3 Data and sample description 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
This study examines 523 Chinese IPOs over the period April 2001 to September 2008: 256 on the SHSE 
and 267 on the SZSE, covering 94.06% of all IPOs issued during the approval system period, which 
replaced the old quota system for selecting IPOs.11 We also include an out-of-sample of 90 IPOs issued 
over the period July 2009 to October 2012 for robustness analysis (see Subsection 5.2). This sample period 
is chosen because of two long-term IPO suspensions in the China stock market from September 2008 to 
July 2009 and from November 2012 to December 2013. All financial firms are excluded due to their highly 
regulated nature, according to the two-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes 83–87. Data 
on the offering price, first trading day closing price, gross proceeds, number of tradable shares, and total 
shares outstanding of each IPO firm are collected from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We also use official websites of the 
SHSE (http://www.sse.com.cn) and SZSE (http://www.szse.cn) as well as prospectuses to double-check 
data accuracy for each IPO candidate.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 523 Chinese IPOs by the year of issuing from 2001 to 2008, in terms 
of the number of IPOs, market-adjusted initial return, and aggregate gross proceeds. The market-adjusted 
initial return of each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first 
trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE 
A-Share Index, respectively. Table 1 shows a mean market-adjusted initial return of 95.16% over the period 
2001 to 2005, which is much lower than the well-documented extremely high level of IPO underpricing 
during the 1990s. For example, Mok and Hui (1998) find that 87 IPOs on the SHSE record an underpricing 
of 289.2% from 1990 to 1993, while Chan et al. (2004) report an underpricing of 177.8% of 570 A-share 
IPOs from 1993 to 1998. However, the relatively modest level of underpricing observed from 2001 to 2005 
does not persist in the subsequent period, as we find an average level of underpricing of 146.84% over the 
period 2006 to 2008 reaching 202.50% in 2007. One possible reason for the recurrence of substantial 
underpricing after 2005 is indicated in Figure 1, which illustrates a close relationship between the level of 
                                                          
11 Under the old quota system, the quantity of IPOs to be issued each year was determined by the central government and then 
allocated among regional governments and ministries. The CSRC, the regulatory authority of the China securities market acting 
on behalf of the central government (rather than underwriters) was in charge of pricing and timing of IPOs. As a response to the 
extreme government intervention and to promote a more market-oriented and internationalized IPO allocation system, the quota 
system was replaced by an approval system in April 2001. Since then, underwriters have been taking more responsibility to evaluate 
issuers’ credit standing as well as risk, and been able to recommend qualified firms to the CSRC for the final verification as long 
as the recommended firms meet all relevant standards and requirements (see Su 2015). Therefore, in order to ensure more accurate 
estimation, this study confines the sample to IPOs issued exclusively during the approval system period as this helps reduce the 
possibility that other factors, such as the changing role of underwriters, might affect our results.  
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IPO underpricing and market performance. Specifically, the China stock market maintained a long-term 
downward trend from 2001 to 2005, and then experienced a dramatic rebound from 2006 to 2007 thwarted 
by the 2008 global financial crisis. Figure 2 clearly shows that the variance of initial returns is positively 
related to the level of IPO underpricing, consistent with the prediction of Rock (1986) that, on average, the 
issuers characterized by more severe information asymmetry tend to be more underpriced. 
<Table 1>  
<Figures 1 & 2> 
Table 1 also shows a three-year suspension of IPOs on the SZSE from 2001 to 2003 before the launch 
of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Board on the SZSE in June 2004.12 Compared with the Main 
Board, the SMEs Board has a more customized system with relatively lower entry requirements, providing 
a convenient financing platform for SMEs in the high-tech industry sector. From 2004 to 2008, 75% of IPO 
candidates (267 out of 356) went public on the SMEs Board, so it is not surprising that the average gross 
proceeds of RMB 316.78 million raised by IPOs on the SZSE are significantly smaller than those of RMB 
1,720.95 million raised on the SHSE at the 1% level (t-stat = 3.60; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 16.92).13 The gross 
proceeds are adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI; 2005 = 100), obtained from the China 
Statistical Database of National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In addition, the mean market-adjusted initial 
return of IPOs on the SHSE is 100.80%, which is significantly lower than that of IPOs on the SZSE, 
137.37%, at the 1% level (t-stat = 4.59; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 14.83), implying a negative relationship 
between the IPO size and the level of underpricing. 
<Table 2> 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for IPOs across various issuing mechanisms: bookbuilding 
(BB); online fixed price offering (OFP); SMP offering (SMP); and bookbuilding plus SMP offering (BS). 
The numbers of BB or SMP offerings are comparable (271 for BB versus 208 for SMP), while there are 
much fewer BS or OFP offerings in our sample (26 for OFP; 18 for BS). Table 2 also shows that BB and 
OFP offerings have considerably higher mean (μ) and variance (σ) of initial returns (μ = 145.08% and σ = 
102.30% for BB; μ = 149.61% and σ = 100.00% for OFP), compared with BS and SMP offerings (μ = 
88.11% and σ = 69.98% for BS; μ = 85.04% and σ = 62.98% for SMP). This thus raises concerns on the 
role of underwriters in price discovery and casts doubts on bookbuilding as an efficient issuing mechanism 
of conveying public information during the share allocation process. It is not surprising to observe the 
similar performance between BS and SMP offerings, as a majority of IPOs shares (73.02%) of BS offerings 
are actually allocated using SMP offering. Also, the relatively high mean and variance of initial returns for 
IPOs using bookbuilding are not reduced (μ = 145.14% and σ = 104.80%) after the implementation of The 
Regulation 2004 on January 1st, 2005, suggesting that the institutional change––the introduction of 
                                                          
12 The SHSE operates only a Main Board, while the SZSE operates a Main Board as well as the SMEs Board and the Growth 
Enterprise Board (also known as the ChiNext Board), launched on June 24th, 2004 and on October 30th, 2009, respectively. 
13 The Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric test does not require equal sample sizes and is robust to departures from normality. 
11 
 
bookbuilding into the China stock market––does not contribute to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry and to counteract the adverse market condition during our sample period.  
<Table 3> 
Table 3 shows that the mean and variance of initial returns are persistent for up to 60 trading days 
(equivalent to three months) after listing. For example, the mean market-adjusted three-month buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of all IPOs in our sample are 
94.87% (σ = 91.41%) and 112.70% (σ = 91.02%), respectively, suggesting that IPO underpricing is not a 
first day temporary price pressure phenomenon in the China stock market. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Preliminaries 
We initially examine whether a specific issuing mechanism is more efficient than others for pricing IPOs. 
We introduce three dummy variables of BB, BS, and SMP, which represent BB, BS, and SMP offerings in 
Eq. (1), respectively; the effect of OFP offering is captured by the intercept term. Also, we include a set of 
firm-specific variables generally employed as proxies for apparent risk of IPOs to capture the unique 
features of the China stock market. Specifically, LNSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the raised gross 
proceeds of the IPO firm in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100); TECH is a dummy variable 
set to one if the IPO firm has some high-tech related contents based on the three-digit ICB codes (see 
Appendix), and zero otherwise; EXG is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm is listed on the SHSE, 
and zero otherwise; STATE represents the fraction of tradable shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO 
firm; and REG is a dummy variable set to one if IPO shares are issued after the implementation of The 
Regulation 2004 on January 1st, 2005, and zero otherwise.14 Thus, we regress the market-adjusted initial 
returns (IR) or the market-adjusted three-month BHARs (BHAR60) of IPOs on all firm-specific control 
variables, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms, along with two indicator variables for years (YEAR) 
and industries (INDUSTRY) based on the two-digit ICB codes, to control for the potential year and industry 
fixed effects, respectively. The regression model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵 +
𝛽7𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀. 
(1) 
Table 4 shows that the dummy variable of SMP generates small and statistically insignificant 
coefficients of 0.2626 (t-stat = 1.40) and 0.2100 (t-stat = 1.22) in Regressions (1) and (6), respectively, very 
close to those on BS, i.e., 0.2824 (t-stat = 1.58) and 0.2253 (t-stat = 1.29) in Regressions (1) and (6), 
respectively, which could be explained by the similar characteristics between BS and SMP offerings, given 
the fact that a majority of IPOs shares (73.02%, on average) of BS offerings are actually allocated using 
SMP offering.15 However, the dummy variable of BB generates much higher and statistically significant 
                                                          
14 We test the potential influence of multicollinearity in the regression analyses by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
VIF is defined as 1/(1 – R2), where R2 is obtained from the regression of one variable on all other regressors specified in the 
regression model. All of multiple regressions yield a value of VIF of less than 2.5, much smaller than the commonly accepted 
threshold of 10, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity in the regression analyses. 
15 Given the limited sample of 18 BS offerings and the fact that over 70% of IPO shares of BS offerings are actually allocated using 
SMP offering, we replicate all regression analyses either excluding all BS offerings in our sample or combining BS and SMP 
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coefficients of 0.5870 (t-stat = 2.37) and 0.4489 (t-stat = 2.21) in Regressions (1) and (6), respectively, at 
the 5% level. Thus, our preliminary results support H1 that, compared bookbuilding, SMP offering is a 
more efficient issuing mechanism in reducing the level of IPO underpricing. 
<Table 4> 
4.2 The impact of market conditions on the level of IPO underpricing 
We then test whether market conditions (market return and volatility) have an impact on the level of IPO 
underpricing. Given no specific priors on the length of the pre-offering period that might affect the level of 
underpricing, we investigate several different time periods which encompass the time frame when an IPO 
is being planned and implemented. Thus, for each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE, the market return variables 
are constructed for the one-week (MktRet_1w), one-month (MktRet_1m), and three-month (MktRet_3m) 
periods before the offering date as an estimate of the buy-and-hold return (BHR) on the SHSE or SZSE A-
Share Index, respectively. Also, a one-month weighted market return variable (MktRet_3w) is constructed 
as a weighted average BHR of the corresponding market index return in three months prior to offering. The 
weights are three for the most recent month, two for the next, and one for the third month prior to offering, 
based on the assumption that investors’ perceptions take the last three months into account, but give heavier 
weight to recent periods (Derrien and Womack 2003). Thus, we regress IR and BHAR60, separately, on a 
set of firm-specific control variables, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms, and indicator variables, 
included in Eq. (1), as well as on each market return variable. The regression model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽9[𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒] + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀. 
(2) 
The left side of Table 4 shows that all market return variables are statistically and economically 
positive and significant in Regressions (2–5) with the use of IR as the dependent variable. For example, in 
Regression (5), the market return variable of MktRet_3w is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat = 
4.17), while the coefficient of 3.0158 also suggests that an increase on market return of 1% monthly, on 
average, gives rise to an additional increase of 3.0158% on the first day return. In addition, the explanatory 
power of Regression (5), an adjusted R2 of 0.2631, is driven by the market return variable, as the adjusted 
R2 is substantially reduced to 0.0637 in Regression (1) when the market return variable is not included. The 
right side of Table 4 shows a similarly positive impact of market return on the short-run underpricing of 
IPOs in Regressions (7–10), using BHAR60 as the dependent variable. In the rest of the study, we report 
the results with the use of MktRet_3w as the major market return variable. 
We further test whether market conditions in terms of market volatility (MktVol_1m), measured as 
the standard deviation of the daily return of the relevant SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index in one month prior 
to offering, have an impact on the level of IPO underpricing. In addition to a set of firm-specific control 
variables, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms, market return variable of MktRet_3w, and indicator 
                                                          




variables, included in Eq. (2), we introduce the market volatility variable of MktVol_1m. The regression 
model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵
+ 𝛽7𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀. 
(3) 
We find that the market volatility variable (similar to the market return variable) also plays an 
important role in explaining the level of IPO underpricing. For example, the left side of Table 5 shows 
statistically and economically significant coefficients of MktVol_1m, 3.8488 (t-stat = 2.67) and 3.8161 (t-
stat = 2.61), at the 1% level, in Regressions (11) and (13), respectively, using IR or BHAR60 as the 
dependent variable.  
<Table 5> 
Market practitioners generally suggest that the typical aim of underwriters is not only to underprice, 
at least modestly, but also to control aftermarket price variations, especially on the downside (Derrien and 
Womack 2003). Inferring from this, we would suggest that an efficient issuing mechanism is reflected in 
lower underpricing and/or lower variance proxied by the cross-sectional squared deviations of IPO 
underpricing. In this study, we also examine the impact of market conditions on the variance of IPO 
underpricing, which is assumed to be related to the same firm-specific characteristics that are posited to 
affect the level of underpricing. The dependent variables of squared deviations of IR and BHAR60 used in 
Regressions (15) and (17) are constructed as the squared residuals from Regressions (11) and (13), 
respectively. The right side of Table 5 shows that market conditions in terms of both market return and 
market volatility have a significantly positive impact on the variance of IPO underpricing. 
In sum, the results presented in Table 5 confirm that market conditions, in terms of both market return 
and volatility in the near-term months before the offering dates, have statistically significant impacts on the 
mean and variance of initial and short-run underpricing of IPOs.  
4.3 The impact of issuing mechanisms on the control of market conditions 
We finally construct two additional sets of market conditional issuing mechanism (interaction) variables: 
the products of market return variable of MktRet_3w with each issuing mechanism dummy 
(MktRet_3w×BB, MktRet_3w×BS, MktRet_3w×OFP, and MktRet_3w×SMP) to reflect recent market 
performance and the products of market volatility variable of MktVol_1m with each issuing mechanism 
dummy (MktVol_1m×BB, MktVol_1m×BS, MktVol_1m×OFP, and MktVol_1m×SMP) to reflect potential 
market risk. The regression model is presented as follows: 
𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤
× 𝑂𝐹𝑃 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽14𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚
× 𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑂𝐹𝑃 + 𝛽16𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅




The left side of Table 5 shows different impacts of market conditions on IPO underpricing given 
each issuing mechanism. Specifically, for BB or OFP offerings, the recent market return has a significantly 
stronger effect on the level of underpricing than for BS and SMP offerings. For example, Regression (12) 
shows statistically significant interaction variables of MktRet_3w×BB (coefficient = 4.1027; t-stat = 2.92), 
at the 1% level, and MktRet_3w×OFP (coefficient = 3.7052; t-stat = 2.42), at the 5% level, much stronger 
compared with the statistically insignificant coefficients on MktRet_3w×BS (coefficient = 1.6762; t-stat = 
1.57) and MktRet_3w×SMP (coefficient = 1.5463; t-stat = 1.52). The untabulated z-statistics of difference 
tests also indicate that the coefficients of interaction variables between MktRet_3w×BB and 
MktRet_3w×SMP (p-value = 0.0007) as well as between MktRet_3w×OFP and MktRet_3w×SMP (p-value 
= 0.0012) are statistically different at the 1% level,16 suggesting that SMP offering is more efficient in 
controlling for the effect of market return on IPO underpricing.  
We also report the impact of recent market volatility on IPO underpricing across various issuing 
mechanisms. Table 5 shows that MktVol_1m×BB exhibits a statistically significant effect at the 1% level 
(coefficient = 3.8999; t-stat = 2.98) in Regressions (12), which is much stronger than MktVol_1m×OFP 
(coefficient = 2.2058; t-stat = 2.04) and MktVol_1m×SMP (coefficient = 1.8954; t-stat = 1.28). The 
untabulated z-statistics of difference tests also confirm that the coefficients between MktVol_1m×BB and 
MktVol_1m×OFP (p-value = 0.0028) as well as between MktVol_1m×BB and MktVol_1m×SMP (p-value 
= 0.0009) are statistically different at the 1% level. Overall, bookbuilding seems particularly prone to 
market conditions––an increase of 1% in market return (volatility) is associated with 4.1027% (3.8999%) 
increase in the level of IPO underpricing. Similar results are found in Regression (14) with the use of 
BHAR60 as the dependent variable, confirming that when compared with bookbuilding (which is more 
sensitive to the market return and volatility), SMP offering is more efficient in controlling for the effect of 
market conditions on both initial and short-run underpricing.  
Finally, Regression (16) explaining squared deviations of IR shows that both market return and 
volatility variables are positively correlated with the variability of IPO underpricing, the result of which is 
mostly driven by the higher cross-sectional variability in bookbuilding. Specifically, in Regression (16), 
the untabulated z-statistics of difference tests show that the coefficient on MktRet_3w×BB, 1.7161 (t-stat = 
2.21), is significantly different from that of MktRet_3w×SMP, 0.2345 (t-stat = 0.27), at the 1% level (p-
value = 0.0008), and from that of MktRet_3w×OFP, 0.6629 (t-stat = 2.09), at the 5% level (p-value = 
0.0228). Also, the interaction variable of MktVol_1m×BB generates a coefficient of 1.5563 (t-stat = 2.80), 
which is significantly stronger than that of MktVol_1m×SMP, 0.1574 (t-stat = 0.69), at the 1% level (p-
value = 0.0017), and significantly stronger than that of MktVol_1m×OFP, 0.9038 (t-stat = 1.85), at the 5% 
level (p-value = 0.0291). Similar results are presented in Regression (18) with the use of the squared 
deviation of BHAR60 as the dependent variable. Thus, we confirm that the variability of initial and short-
run underpricing is more sensitive to market volatility for bookbuilding than for SMP and OFP offerings.  
                                                          
16 Following Clogg et al. (1995), we employ z-statistics to test the statistical difference between the two interaction coefficients: 
𝑧 = (𝛽𝑎 − 𝛽𝑏) (𝑆𝐸 × 𝛽𝑎






In sum, the two sets of market condition results support H2 that, from a conditional point of view, 
SMP offering is more efficient in counteracting adverse market conditions as it seems to be largely immune 
from the impact of market return and volatility.  
5 Robustness tests 
5.1 Controlling for the problem of endogeneity 
Much theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the choice of IPO issuing mechanism might be 
endogenously determined (see Ljungqvist and Wihelm 2002; Derrien and Womack 2003). If this is the case, 
the problem of endogeneity could possibly bias our previous regression coefficients and conclusions. To 
address the potential self-selection bias and to confirm the validity of our previous conclusions, we employ 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure in this subsection. 
In the first-stage regression, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that an issuer tends to 
choose SMP offering. The dependent variable is a binary dummy variable set to one if the issuer chooses 
SMP offering, and zero otherwise. Inspired by Ljungqvist and Wihelm (2002) and Derrien and Womack 
(2003), we choose four additional variables, which are exogenous with respect to IPO underpricing. For 
example, LN(AGE +1) represents the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years since the founding 
year of the IPO firm as of the offering date; LNLAG represents the natural logarithm of the number of days 
between the offering and listing dates; BM represents the book to market value of the IPO firm as of the 
offering date; and NUMBER represents the number of IPOs issued during the six weeks before to two weeks 
after the offering date. In order to confirm that these variables are unlinked with IPO underpricing, we 
regress the dependent variables of IR and BHAR60, separately, on each chosen exogenous variable and 
eliminate both LN(AGE +1) and BM that exhibit coefficients with p-values of less than 10%. The first-stage 
probit regression (selection equation) is presented as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑀𝑃 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼4𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛼5𝐸𝑋𝐺
+ 𝛼6𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 + 𝛼8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜉. 
(5) 
The second-stage OLS regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) derived from the first-stage 
regression as an additional regressor to correct for the self-selection bias. Specifically, 𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(𝛾𝑍𝑖) [1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑍𝑖)]⁄ , where ϕ represents the standard normal density function; Φ represents the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function; γ represents the first-stage probit estimation of the selection 
equation; and Z represents the corresponding explanatory variables in the probit regression. The second-
stage OLS regression is presented as follows:  
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑀
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝐵
+ 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜_1𝑚 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽11𝜆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀. 
(6) 
Table 6 reports the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression results, based on a sample of 479 IPOs 
using either BB or SMP offering, again confirming that previous conclusions still hold up fairly well after 
controlling for the problem of endogeneity. Specifically, the first-stage regression results in Regression (19) 
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suggest the presence of a self-selection bias. For example, the coefficient on the market return variable of 
MktRet_3w is significantly negative at the 1% level (coefficient = –2.4509; t-stat = –2.68), while the 
coefficient on the market volatility variable of MktVol_1m is significantly positive at the 1% level 
(coefficient = 1.7798; t-stat = 2.63), the results of which imply that issuers are more likely to choose SMP 
offering in a declining market with heavy uncertainty. The McFadden R2 of 0.5421 indicates a strong 
explanatory power of the selection equation. 
<Table 6> 
In addition, Table 6 shows that the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage OLS regression is 
significantly positive in Regressions (20–23) at the 5% level. The statistical significance of λ implies the 
importance of taking the problem of endogeneity into account. The second-stage regression results show 
that the coefficients and statistical significances of other independent variables remain qualitatively similar 
to those presented in Table 5, again confirming that SMP offering is more efficient in controlling for adverse 
market conditions in the form of lower market return and/or higher market volatility. 
5.2 Out-of-sample test 
To further test the robustness of our results, we extend our analysis to account for the potential influence 
of the exchange of listing. Specifically, since the launch of the SMEs Board in June 2004, the SZSE has 
been specially designed for young, small and medium size firms in the high-tech industry sector, while the 
SHSE features more established firms. As such, both stock exchanges are likely to have different risk 
profiles that will influence the level of IPO underpricing. Therefore, we replicate all tests in Table 5, 
exclusively using an out-of-sample of 343 IPOs on the SHSE over the period April 2001 to October 2012: 
146 for BB, 26 for OFP, and 171 for SMP. The regression results shown in Table 7 are qualitatively the 
same as those presented in Table 5.  
<Table 7> 
5.3 More robustness tests 
We conduct several additional robustness tests. For example, we winsorize the extreme values of the 
dependent variable of IR and BHAR60 at 1% and 99% prior to regression estimation, to avoid any potential 
misleading conclusions resulted from outliers. The results based on a trimmed sample are qualitatively the 
same, suggesting that outliers do not appear to be driving the results. Also, we use the pre-listing market 
condition variables in all regression equations, and again our results are qualitatively similar to those based 
on the pre-offering market condition variables.  
Furthermore, Appendix shows that a total of 15 utilities (14 listed on the SHSE and one on the SZSE) 
are included in our sample. Of the 15 utilities, five use bookbuilding, eight are SMP offerings, and two are 
BS offerings. We replicate all regression analyses with the use of a subsample of 508 IPOs excluding the 
15 utilities. The regression results confirm that our previous conclusions––SMP offering leads to lower 
underpricing and lower cross-sectional variation of short-run returns of IPOs; SMP offering is better able 
to counteract adverse market conditions in the form of low market return and/or high market volatility––
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remain qualitatively unchanged. These results are not reported for the sake of brevity, but available on 
request. 
6 Conclusions 
The existence of several basic and substantially different issuing mechanisms in the China stock market 
offers an ideal arena to address the challenging question of which issuing mechanism is more efficient for 
pricing IPOs. This study aims to test two possible criteria for assessing the efficiency of any given IPO 
issuing mechanism, that is, whether an efficient issuing mechanism is able to lead to less underpricing and 
lower cross-sectional variation of initial returns, and able to counteract adverse market conditions in the 
form of low market returns and/or high market volatility (Derrien and Womack 2003). Our empirical results 
show that, compared with bookbuilding, SMP offering is associated with greater efficiency for pricing IPOs 
in the face of adverse market conditions. Our results are robust to various alternative tests after controlling 
for the problem of endogeneity and for the influence of exchange of listing.  
Our results highlight the difficulty of underwriters in accurately pricing IPOs and cast doubts on 
bookbuilding as an efficient issuing mechanism of conveying public information during the share allocation 
process. Specifically, if the market is volatile and signals are noisy, then the impact of information flows 
on different investor groups becomes blurred. We could expect the IPO price distribution to be wider and 
underpricing to grow faster in a volatile market than that observed under a benign market condition (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986). In this type of situation, the price-based market mechanism cannot ex ante fully resolve 
uncertainty relating even to public information; investors naturally then look to non-price information 
signals, and one approach for less-informed investors is to rely heavily on the purchasing actions of 
informed investors.  
It is in this context that SMP offering has an advantage over other issuing mechanisms, as it makes 
the use of secondary market existing investors as signal conduits. These experienced investors who are 
holding shares in the secondary market have phenomenal knowledge of share ownership of listed firms in 
different market conditions and are better able to deal with noisy signals. Their behavior could be 
intentionally followed by less-informed investors in making decisions concerning potential IPO investment. 
Therefore, the quality of signals is expected to be better in SMP offering. As a transitional institutional 
setting, SMP offering was built on the existence of the split-share structure in the China stock market, in 
attempts to reduce the IPO subscription costs for investors in the secondary market. However, with the 
formal launch of the split-share structure reform in 2005, non-tradable shares were gradually converted into 
tradable shares and the foundation of SMP offering thus no longer existed. In recent years, the CSRC have 
formulated a series of regulations in attempts to establish a more market-oriented issuing mechanism in the 
China stock market. Whether these reforms really enhance the efficiency of the bookbuilding process and 




Appendix: Distribution of all IPOs by the industry category 
This appendix presents the distribution of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 2008 by the industry category, according to the three-digit ICB codes, in terms of 
the total number of IPOs, market-adjusted initial returns, and aggregate gross proceeds. The market-adjusted initial return (IR) is computed as: 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐹𝑃𝑖,1 𝑂𝑃𝑖,0⁄ ) − (𝐼𝑖,1 𝐼𝑖,0⁄ ), where FPi,1 and OPi,0 
are the first trading day closing price and the offering price of IPO i, respectively; Ii,1 and Ii,0 are the corresponding SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index at the end of the first trading day and at the offering 
day of IPO i, respectively. The gross proceeds are presented in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100). Like Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Su and Bangassa (2011a, b), we define IPO 
firms with high-tech related products and/or services as those in sectors of the ICB: 2710 (Aerospace & Defense), 2730 (Electronic & Electrical Equipment), 3350 (Automobiles & Parts), 4530 (Health 
Care Equipment & Services), 4570 (Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology), 6570 (Mobile Telecommunications), 9530 (Software & Computer Services), and 9570 (Technology Hardware & Equipment). 
The final three rows summarize the distribution of 161 high-tech related IPOs, of 362 non-high-tech related IPOs, and of the full sample. 
   SHSE  SZSE  Whole market 
Industry Super-sector Sector No. IR (%) 
Gross 
proceeds 
 No. IR (%) 
Gross 
proceeds 
 No. IR (%) 
Gross 
proceeds 
0001 Oil & Gas  0500 Oil & Gas  0530 Oil & Gas Producers 2 152.67 63,164.61  1 209.93 283.19  3 171.76 63,447.80 
  0570 Oil Equipment, Services, & Distribution 2 122.75 7,162.88  2 150.40 1,115.58  4 136.58 8,278.46 
  0580 Alternative Energy –– –– ––  2 164.86 2,148.14  2 164.86 2,148.14 
1000 Basic Materials  1300 Chemicals  1350 Chemicals 15 105.01 5,163.37  35 127.48 10,127.41  50 120.74 15,290.78 
 1700 Basic Resources  1730 Forestry & Paper 6 153.94 2,254.99  5 93.89 2,345.43  11 126.64 4,600.42 
  1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 21 87.32 25,892.29  10 184.79 3,560.72  31 118.76 29,453.00 
  1770 Mining 16 82.82 108,821.96  3 230.57 2,425.81  19 106.15 111,247.77 
2000 Industrials  2300 Construction & Materials  2350 Construction & Materials 20 71.97 49,207.04  22 114.00 7,661.04  42 93.99 56,868.08 
 2700 Industrial Goods & Services  2710 Aerospace & Defense 8 107.79 3,672.42  2 107.09 747.27  10 107.65 4,419.69 
  2720 General Industrials 1 54.41 253.86  5 59.47 2,140.62  6 58.63 2,394.48 
  2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 15 162.34 4,222.57  41 165.31 11,556.88  56 164.51 15,779.45 
  2750 Industrial Engineering 27 119.89 15,434.86  25 163.01 6,937.18  52 140.62 22,372.04 
  2770 Industrial Transportation 17 74.31 60,722.77  3 155.40 1,253.91  20 86.47 61,976.68 
  2790 Support Services 1 267.89 153.65  4 94.09 887.25  5 128.85 1,040.90 
3000 Consumer Goods  3300 Automobiles & Parts  3350 Automobiles & Parts 4 43.95 2,369.82  10 101.79 2,145.06  14 85.26 4,514.88 
 3500 Food & Beverage  3530 Beverages 4 86.94 3,383.16  –– –– ––  4 86.94 3,383.16 
  3570 Food Producers 16 111.54 8,183.18  13 147.14 4,170.53  29 127.49 12,353.71 
 3700 Personal & Household Goods  3720 Household Goods & Home Construction 3 64.60 909.22  12 96.75 4,320.13  15 90.32 5,229.35 
  3740 Leisure Goods –– –– ––  3 97.26 888.45  3 97.26 888.45 
  3760 Personal Goods 11 41.76 5,106.68  19 111.73 5,272.11  30 86.07 10,378.79 
4000 Health Care  4500 Health Care  4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 2 106.61 623.75  1 65.30 219.05  3 92.84 842.81 
  4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 20 115.86 8,941.52  13 109.76 2,841.48  33 113.46 11,783.01 
5000 Consumer Services  5300 Retail  5330 Food & Drug Retailers 1 115.34 419.41  2 124.36 1,097.05  3 121.35 1,516.46 
  5370 General Retailers 2 131.68 648.41  2 169.06 855.24  4 150.37 1,503.65 
 5500 Media  5550 Media 1 327.65 611.16  2 190.50 908.90  3 236.21 1,520.06 
 5700 Travel & Leisure  5750 Travel & Leisure 7 109.40 19,560.69  4 209.07 916.89  11 145.64 20,477.58 
6000 Telecommunications  6500 Telecommunications  6570 Mobile Telecommunications 1 29.12 12,304.73  2 180.95 486.57  3 130.34 12,791.30 
7000 Utilities  7500 Utilities  7530 Electricity 12 94.21 22,681.80  1 50.58 298.50  13 90.85 22,980.30 
  7570 Gas, Water, & Multiutilities 2 102.99 493.84  –– –– ––  2 102.99 493.84 
9000 Technology  9500 Technology  9530 Software & Computer Services 10 101.59 3,504.78  11 167.35 2,446.54  21 136.04 5,951.32 
  9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 9 76.91 4,692.96  12 132.87 4,523.24  21 108.89 9,216.20 
High-tech related firms  69 112.19 40,332.55  92 144.56 24,966.11  161 130.68 65,298.66 
Non-high-tech related firms  187 96.60 400,229.84  175 133.59 59,614.07  362 114.48 459,843.91 
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Table 1 Distribution of IPOs by the year of listing 
 SHSE  SZSE  Whole Market 
 No. IR (%) Gross proceeds  No. IR (%) Gross proceeds  No. IR (%) Gross proceeds 
2001 36 156.54 26,372.18  –– –– ––  36 156.54 26,372.18 
2002 66 127.79 41,305.98  –– –– ––  66 127.79 41,305.98 
2003 65 72.40 42,016.54  –– –– ––  65 72.40 42,016.54 
2004 58 72.72 23,727.29  37 71.17 9,083.26  95 72.11 32,810.55 
2005 3 76.34 2,854.54  12 42.11 2,908.53  15 48.95 5,763.07 
2006 9 36.76 45,029.21  56 92.59 17,576.35  65 84.86 62,605.56 
2007 14 141.43 194,064.67  93 211.69 29,728.67  107 202.50 223,793.34 
2008 5 54.48 65,191.98  69 125.60 25,283.37  74 120.79 90,475.35 
2001 – 2005 228 101.85 136,276.53  49 64.05 11,991.79  277 95.16 148,268.32 
2006 – 2008 28 92.26 304,285.86   218 153.85 72,588.39   246 146.84 376,874.25 
Total 256 100.80 440,562.39   267 137.37 84,580.18   523 119.47 525,142.57 
This table presents the distribution of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 2008 by the year 
of listing, in terms of the number of IPOs, market-adjusted initial returns, and aggregate gross proceeds. The market-adjusted initial 
return (IR) is computed as: 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐹𝑃𝑖,1 𝑂𝑃𝑖,0⁄ ) − (𝐼𝑖,1 𝐼𝑖,0⁄ ), where FPi,1 and OPi,0 are the first trading day closing price and the 
offering price of IPO i, respectively; Ii,1 and Ii,0 are the corresponding SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index at the end of the first trading 





Table 2 Descriptive statistics of IPOs across various issuing mechanisms 
 BB BS OFP SMP ALL 
2001 10 0 26 0 36 
2002 18 0 0 48 66 
2003 0 0 0 65 65 
2004 0 0 0 95 95 
2005 0 15 0 0 15 
2006 65 0 0 0 65 
2007 104 3 0 0 107 
2008 74 0 0 0 74 
SHSE 56 3 26 171 256 
SZSE 215 15 0 37 267 
High-tech related issuers 82 3 9 67 161 
Non-high-tech related issuers 189 15 17 141 362 
Pre-The Regulation 2004 28 –– 26 208 262 
Post-The Regulation 2004 243 18 –– –– 261 
Total 271 18 26 208 523 
LAG 13.79 15.39 23.23 15.97 15.18 
STATE (%) 21.17 24.12 31.76 32.81 26.43 
SIZE 1,450.23 365.24 780.88 506.03 1,004.10 
Mean of IR (%) 145.08 88.11 149.61 85.04 119.47 
Pre-The Regulation 2004 144.55 –– 149.61 85.04 97.78 
Post-The Regulation 2004 145.14 88.11 –– –– 141.21 
Standard deviation (SD) of IR (%) 102.30 69 .98 100.00 62.98 93.33 
Pre-The Regulation 2004 85.32 –– 100.00 62.98 74.49 
Post-The Regulation 2004 104.80 69.98 –– –– 104.61 
Pre-offering market return (%) 2.46 –2.09 –0.85 –1.23 0.67 
Pre-offering market volatility (%) 2.07 1.52 1.00 1.14 1.63 
Pre-listing market return (%) 2.48 –3.35 –1.71 –1.52 0.48 
Pre-listing market volatility (%) 2.08 1.51 1.19 1.12 1.63 
This table presents descriptive statistics of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 2008 across 
various issuing mechanisms: bookbuilding (BB); secondary market proportional offering (SMP); bookbuilding plus secondary 
market proportional offering (BS); and online fixed price offering (OFP).  
High-tech related issuers are confirmed when the IPO firm has some high-tech related contents, according to the ICB (see the 
distribution of all IPOs in our sample by the industry category in Appendix). All issuers are also identified by whether they are 
issued before or after implementing The Regulation 2004 on January 1st, 2005. LAG represents the gap (calendar days) between 
the offering and listing dates; STATE represents the fraction of tradable shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO firm; SIZE 
represents the raised aggregate gross proceeds of the IPO firm in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100); the market-
adjusted initial return (IR) is computed as: 𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐹𝑃𝑖,1 𝑂𝑃𝑖,0⁄ ) − (𝐼𝑖,1 𝐼𝑖,0⁄ ), where FPi,1 and OPi,0 are the first trading day closing 
price and the offering price of IPO i, respectively; Ii,1 and Ii,0 are the corresponding SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index at the end of the 
first trading day and at the offering day of IPO i, respectively; Pre-offering (Pre-listing) market return represents the weighted 
average buy-and-hold return (BHR) of the corresponding returns on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index in three months prior to 
offering (prior to listing), where the weights are 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the next, and 1 for the third month prior to 
offering (Derrien and Womack 2003); Pre-offering (Pre-listing) market volatility represents the standard deviations of the daily 






Table 3 Market-adjusted short-run returns of IPOs across various issuing mechanisms 
 BB  BS  OFP  SMP  ALL 
 Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%)  Mean (%) SD (%) 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
5 138.22 97.34  42.00 38.19  142.41 96.34  78.70 61.26  112.00 89.15 
10 136.53 98.18  44.49 40.82  136.86 94.39  74.91 61.85  109.40 89.88 
20 134.69 101.16  41.97 43.06  127.07 90.46  69.61 60.76  105.77 91.58 
30 132.28 97.81  38.20 46.45  115.07 87.96  65.63 59.75  102.22 89.50 
40 134.96 101.41  40.78 44.27  103.24 81.43  59.90 60.26  100.83 92.73 









Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
5 146.60 103.04  48.95 31.88  149.61 100.00  85.04 62.98  119.47 93.33 
10 143.33 101.70  43.77 34.64  147.82 100.24  82.57 63.12  116.53 92.58 
20 141.52 101.00  45.62 36.42  146.95 99.48  81.52 63.51  115.18 92.09 
30 139.44 101.25  48.20 35.22  146.57 98.48  80.41 63.54  113.70 91.97 
40 138.56 99.48  50.55 34.41  147.06 97.86  79.71 63.33  113.05 90.79 









This table presents the mean and standard deviation (SD) of market-adjusted short-run BHARs (in Panel A) and CARs (in Panel 
B) of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 2008 across various issuing mechanisms: 
bookbuilding (BB; 271 IPOs); secondary market proportional offering (SMP; 208 IPOs); bookbuilding plus secondary market 
proportional offering (BS; 18 IPOs); and online fixed price offering (OFP; 26 IPOs). 
The average annual number of trading days from 2001 to 2008 in the China stock market is 242, so we define an event year as a 
242-trading-day interval following the first day of listing, with an average of 20 trading days per month. We evaluate the market-
adjusted BHARs and CARs up to 60 event days (three months) after listing. 
Following the calculation introduced by Loughran and Ritter (1995), we define the market-adjusted BHARi,t on IPO i as: 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
[∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ] − [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ], where Ri,t and Rm,t are the daily return on IPO i and the corresponding market 
benchmark, respectively, in event day t following listing. The SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index provides the benchmark for IPOs on 
the SHSE or SZSE, respectively. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 on a portfolio of N IPOs for a holding period of 





𝑖=1 . To control for the potential skewness bias in the short-run returns, we use the 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) to evaluate whethwe the BHAR is significantly different 






𝛾), where: 𝑆 =  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡)
, and ?̂? =  




3 , where 𝛾 is the estimate 
of the coefficient of skewness. 
The market-adjusted return ARit on firm i in event day t is defined as: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t. The mean market-adjusted return ARt on a 





𝑖=1 . Therefore, the cumulative market-adjusted returns CART 
from event day 1 to event day T are the summation of ARt: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , while t-statistics of the CART are determined and 
computed using the methodology employed by Ritter (1991) as: 𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇) = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 × √𝑁 𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡⁄ ,  where csdt is computed as: 
𝑐𝑠𝑑𝑡 = [𝑡 × 𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 2 ×  (𝑡 − 1) × 𝑐𝑜𝑣]
1 2⁄ , where var is the mean cross-sectional variance over the 60 event days, and cov is the 




Table 4 Regressions of mean market-adjusted initial returns and three-month BHARs on the firm-specific control variables, 
dummy variable of issuing mechanisms, various market return variables, and indicator variables, using a sample of 523 
IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE 
 
Mean of IR 
 
Mean of BHAR60 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
INTERCEPT 0.7425 0.7343 0.7126 0.7269 0.7238  0.5260 0.5251 0.5167 0.5129 0.5185 
 (2.81)
*** (2.75)*** (2.63)*** (2.67)*** (2.65)***  (2.39)
** (2.34)** (2.29)** (2.25)** (2.32)** 
LNSIZE –0.4605 –0.4358 –0.4350 –0.4262 –0.4223  –0.2715 –0.2521 –0.2431 –0.2122 –0.2135 
 (–2.44)
** (–2.41)** (–2.36)** (–2.31)** (–2.30)**  (–2.26)
** (–2.25)** (–2.19)** (–2.11)** (–2.15)** 
TECH 0.2021 0.1903 0.2055 0.1843 0.1877  0.2464 0.2474 0.2308 0.2438 0.2297 
 (1.47) (1.46) (1.50) (1.34) (1.45)  (1.18) (1.23) (1.10) (1.15) (1.12) 
EXG –0.1710 –0.1674 –0.1516 –0.1790 –0.1828  –0.1583 –0.1558 –0.1389 –0.1548 –0.1519 
 (–1.28) (–1.31) (–1.36) (–1.34) (–1.38)  (–1.19) (–1.22) (–1.17) (–1.20) (–1.22) 
STATE –1.6972 –1.5322 –1.7095 –1.7015 –1.6307  –1.1639 –1.2343 –1.1775 –1.1438 –1.2124 
 (–2.26)
** (–2.23)** (–2.33)** (–2.27)** (–2.28)**  (–2.15)
** (–2.18)** (–2.21)** (–2.23)** (–2.15)** 
REG 0.2929 0.2662 0.2222 0.2517 0.2492  0.1812 0.1788 0.1617 0.1446 0.1324 
 (1.94)* (1.89)* (1.82)* (1.87)* (1.83)*  (1.73)* (1.68)* (1.67)* (1.75)* (1.74)* 
BB 0.5870 0.5355 0.5090 0.5011 0.4736  0.4489 0.4649 0.4590 0.4557 0.4201 
 (2.37)** (2.22)** (2.14)** (2.16)** (2.02)**  (2.21)** (2.11)** (2.09)** (2.33)** (2.01)** 
BS 0.2824 0.2855 0.2884 0.2506 0.2593  0.2253 0.2384 0.2453 0.2245 0.2200 
 (1.58) (1.53) (1.45) (1.49) (1.51)  (1.39) (1.46) (1.44) (1.41) (1.31) 
SMP 0.2626 0.2868 0.2558 0.2339 0.2405  0.2100 0.2294 0.2342 0.2124 0.2051 
 (1.40) (1.49) (1.42) (1.28) (1.33)  (1.22) (1.36) (1.40) (1.34) (1.28) 
MktRet_1w  3.1135      3.4225    
  (3.98)
***      (4.33)
***    
MktRet_1m   2.9034      3.2303   
   (4.18)
***      (4.45)
***   
MktRet_3m    2.9547      3.4078  
    (3.94)
***      (4.28)
***  
MktRet_3w     3.0158      3.4561 
     (4.17)
***      (4.40)
*** 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.0637 0.2867 0.2587 0.2586 0.2631   0.0562 0.2402 0.2478 0.2558 0.2417 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions explaining the mean market-adjusted initial returns (IR) and three-
month BHARs (BHAR60) with the use of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 2008. IR of 
each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and offering 
price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. BHAR60 is measured as the 
market-adjusted three-month BHR as shown in Table 3. The regression model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃
+ 𝛽9[𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒] + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀, 
where LNSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the raised aggregate gross proceeds of the IPO firm in millions of RMB, adjusted 
using CPI (2005 = 100); TECH is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm has some high-tech related contents, according to 
the ICB, and zero otherwise (see the distribution of all IPOs in our sample by the industry category in Appendix); EXG is a dummy 
variable set to one if the IPO firm is listed on the SHSE, and zero otherwise; STATE represents the fraction of tradable shares by 
total shares outstanding of the IPO firm; REG is a dummy variable set to one if the IPO firm issues new shares after January 1st, 
2005 when The Regulation 2004 was applicable, and zero otherwise; and BB, BS, and SMP represent bookbuilding (BB; 271 IPOs), 
bookbuilding plus secondary market proportional offering (BS; 18 IPOs), and secondary market proportional offering (SMP; 208 
IPOs), respectively. The intercept term captures the effect of online fixed price offering (OFP; 26 IPOs). For each IPO on the SHSE 
or SZSE, the market return variables are constructed for the one-week (MktRet_1w), one-month (MktRet_1m), and three-month 
(MktRet_3m) periods before the offering date as the BHR on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. The three-month 
weighted market return variable (MktRet_3w) is constructed as a weighted average BHR of the corresponding market index return 
in three months prior to offering. The weights are three for the most recent month, two for the next, and one for the third month 
prior to offering (Derrien and Womack, 2003). We also control for the potential year and industry fixed effects using indicator 
variables for years (YEAR) and industries (INDUSTRY), according to the two-digit ICB codes. White heteroscedasticity-consistent 





Table 5 Regressions of mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted initial returns and three-month BHARs on the 
firm-specific control variables, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms, market return and volatility variables, interaction 
variables, and indicator variables, using a sample of 523 IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE 
 Mean of IR   Mean of BHAR60  Squared deviation of IR  Squared deviation of BHAR60 
 (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (15) (16)  (17) (18) 
INTERCEPT 0.5923 0.5845  0.4189 0.4357  0.1557 0.1480  0.1317 0.1282 
 (2.46)
** (2.44)**  (2.15)
** (2.06)**  (1.38) (1.34)  (1.22) (1.19) 
LNSIZE –0.4106 –0.4154  –0.3150 –0.3552  –0.1072 –0.1120  –0.0880 –0.0836 
 (–2.44)
** (–2.47)**  (–2.19)
** (–2.35)**  (–1.75)
* (–1.87)*  (–1.72)
* (–1.73)* 
TECH 0.1281 0.1290  0.1496 0.1543  0.0901 0.0805  0.0564 0.0535 
 (1.12) (1.14)  (1.34) (1.36)  (0.74) (0.68)  (0.64) (0.60) 
EXG –0.1947 –0.2134  –0.1555 –0.1651  –0.1279 –0.1306  –0.1406 –0.1410 
 (–1.50) (–1.49)  (–1.23) (–1.32)  (–1.02) (–1.06)  (–1.11) (–1.13) 
STATE –0.9467 –1.0377  –1.4367 –1.4183  –0.0981 –0.1017  –0.0594 –0.0484 
 (–2.01)
** (–2.14)**  (–2.35)
** (–2.09)**  (–1.80)
* (–1.91)*  (–1.74)
* (–1.70)* 
REG 0.2306 0.2129  0.1623 0.1728  0.0577 0.0558  0.0434 0.0427 
 (1.92)
* (1.85)*  (1.68)
* (1.71)*  (1.81)
* (1.79)*  (1.70)
* (1.68)* 
BB 0.6447 0.6830  0.5800 0.5518  0.1514 0.1554  0.1198 0.1084 
 (2.22)
** (2.35)**  (2.14)
** (2.05)**  (2.05)
** (2.13)**  (2.27)
** (2.11)** 
BS 0.2415 0.2340  0.2214 0.2219  0.1210 0.1258  0.0752 0.0672 
 (1.29) (1.24)  (1.38) (1.41)  (0.76) (0.85)  (0.60) (0.52) 
SMP 0.2316 0.2233  0.2095 0.2061  0.1054 0.1109  0.0619 0.0558 
 (1.23) (1.19)  (1.31) (1.27)  (0.70) (0.79)  (0.47) (0.46) 
MktRet_3w 4.0523   4.3894   2.1487   2.1923  
 (3.53)
***   (3.88)
***   (2.84)
***   (2.97)
***  
MktRet_3w×BB  4.1027   3.9283   1.7161   1.5134 
  (2.92)
***   (2.82)
***   (2.21)
**   (2.02)
** 
MktRet_3w×BS  1.6762   1.4379   0.2559   0.2343 
  (1.57)   (1.45)   (0.59)   (0.46) 
MktRet_3w×OFP  3.7052   3.5651   0.6629   0.5768 
  (2.42)
**   (2.31)
**   (2.09)
**   (2.03)
** 
MktRet_3w×SMP  1.5463   1.3108   0.2345   0.2106 
  (1.52)   (1.41)   (0.27)   (0.24) 
MktVol_1m 3.8488   3.8161   1.7250   1.6267  
 (2.67)
***   (2.61)
***   (2.40)
**   (2.35)
**  
MktVol_1m×BB  3.8999   3.4106   1.5563   1.4717 
  (2.98)
***   (2.84)
***   (2.80)
***   (2.72)
*** 
MktVol_1m×BS  2.1316   2.1102   0.1992   0.1913 
  (1.56)   (1.32)   (0.84)   (0.95) 
MktVol_1m×OFP  2.2058   2.2385   0.9038   0.8660 
  (2.04)
**   (2.14)
**   (1.85)
*   (1.71)
* 
MktVol_1m×SMP  1.8954   1.8383   0.1574   0.1633 
  (1.28)   (1.20)   (0.69)   (0.84) 
YEAR YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.2951 0.3109   0.3039 0.3223   0.2196 0.2357   0.2246 0.2358 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions explaining the mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted 
initial returns (IR) and three-month BHARs (BHAR60) with the use of 523 IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE over the period April 2001 
to September 2008. IR of each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first trading day 
closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. BHAR60 
is measured as the market-adjusted three-month BHR as shown in Table 3. The squared deviations of IR and BHAR60 employed 
in Regressions (15–18) are constructed as the squared residuals from Regressions (11–14), respectively. The regression model is 
presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤
+ 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝑂𝐹𝑃 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑘𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃
+ 𝛽14𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 + 𝛽15𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽16𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝑆 + 𝛽17𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑂𝐹𝑃
+ 𝛽18𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀, 
where the firm-specific control variables of LNSIZE, TECH, EXG, STATE, and REG, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms of 
BB, BS, and SMP, market condition variables of MktRet_3w and MktVol_1m, and indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY are 
as defined in Table 4. The intercept term captures the effect of online fixed price offering (OFP). The interaction variables of 
MktRet_3w×BB, MktRet_3w×BS, MktRet_3w×OFP, and MktRet_3w×SMP represent the products of market return with each 
issuing mechanism; the interaction variables of MktVol_1m×BB, MktVol_1m×BS, MktVol_1m×OFP, and MktVol_1m×SMP 
represent the products of market volatility with each issuing mechanism. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are 





Table 6 Two-stage Heckman (1979) results, using a sample of 479 IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE 
 
First-stage regression  Second-stage regression 
 
Choice of SMP offering  Mean of IR Mean of BHAR60 
Squared deviation 
of IR 
Squared deviation of 
BHAR60 
 
(19)  (20) (21) (22) (23) 
INTERCEPT 1.2421  0.5882 0.5435 0.1622 0.1277 
 (2.00)
**  (2.24)** (2.12)** (0.68) (0.49) 
LNLAG 0.4634      
 (0.95)      
NUMBER 0.0998      
 (2.28)
**      
LNSIZE –0.2869  –0.3223 –0.2382 –0.1213 –0.1058 
 (–2.15)
**  (–2.47)** (–2.26)** –(1.84)* (–1.77)* 
TECH 0.1102  0.1535 0.1735 0.0809 0.0886 
 (0.61)  (1.05) (1.13) (0.85) (0.91) 
EXG 2.3344  –0.2028 –0.3261 –0.1158 –0.1263 
 (2.26)
**  (–1.55) (–1.47) –(1.11) (–1.17) 
STATE –1.4480  –1.0025 –1.0135 –0.1047 –0.1038 
 (–0.92)  (–1.49) (–1.57) –(1.42) (–1.28) 
REG   0.2369 0.2152 0.0924 0.0990 
   (1.75)
* (1.69)* (1.81)* (1.74)* 
SMP   0.4573 0.4671 0.0712 0.0627 
   (2.33)
** (2.46)** (1.81)* (1.71)* 
MktRet_3w –2.4509      
 (–2.68)
***      
MktRet_3w×BB   3.8572 2.7826 0.7543 0.6093 
   (3.11)
*** (2.90)*** (2.29)** (2.04)** 
MktRet_3w×SMP   2.2478 1.6157 0.1682 0.1122 
   (1.56) (1.48) (0.53) (0.46) 
MktVol_1m 1.7798      
 (2.63)
***      
MktVol_1m×BB   3.1415 2.4219 0.7965 0.6995 
   (2.37)
** (2.12)** (2.21)** (2.31)** 
MktVol_1m×SMP   1.9824 1.3289 0.1752 0.1397 
   (1.49) (1.38) (0.95) (0.88) 
λ   0.6001 0.5847 0.4490 0.4269 
   (2.46)** (2.38)** (2.24)** (2.11)** 
YEAR  YES  YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES  YES YES YES YES 
McFadden R2 0.5421      
Adj. R2     0.3620 0.3953 0.2531 0.2611 
This table presents the Heckman (1979) two-stage results on the mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted initial returns 
(IR) and three-month BHARs (BHAR60) with the use of 479 IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE over the period April 2001 to September 
2008. In the first-stage regression, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that an issuer tends to choose SMP offering: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑀𝑃 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝐺 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛼4𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛼5𝐸𝑋𝐺 +
𝛼6𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 + 𝛼8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜉,  
where the dependent variable is a binary dummy variable set to one if the issuer chooses SMP offering, and zero otherwise; LNLAG 
represents the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates; NUMBER represents the number of 
IPOs issued during the six weeks before to two weeks after the issuer’s offering date; the firm-specific control variables of LNSIZE, 
TECH, EXG, and STATE, market condition variables of MktRet_3w and MktVol_1m, and indicator variables of YEAR and 
INDUSTRY are as defined in Table 4. 
The second-stage OLS regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) derived from the first-stage regression as an additional 
regressor to correct for the self-selection bias. Specifically, 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜙(𝛾𝑍𝑖) [1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑍𝑖)]⁄ , where ϕ represents the standard normal 
density function; Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function; γ represents the first-stage probit estimation 
of the selection equation; Z represents the corresponding explanatory variables in the probit regression. IR of each IPO on the SHSE 
or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between the first trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the 
contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. BHAR60 is measured as the market-adjusted three-
month BHR as shown in Table 3. The squared deviations of IR and BHAR60 employed in Regressions (22–23) are constructed as 
the squared residuals from Regressions (20–21), respectively. The second-stage regression model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝐺 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑀 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝐵
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝑆𝑀 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑆𝑀 + 𝛽11𝜆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀, 
where the firm-specific control variables of LNSIZE, TECH, EXG, STATE, and REG, dummy variable of issuing mechanism of 
SMP, and indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY are as defined in Table 4. The intercept term captures the effect of 
bookbuilding (BB). The interaction variables of MktRet_3w×BB, MktRet_3w×SMP, MktVol_1m×BB, and MktVol_1m×SMP are 
as defined in Table 5. White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Regressions of mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted initial returns and three-month BHARs on the 
firm-specific control variables, dummy variables of issuing mechanisms, market return and volatility variables, interaction 
variables, and indicator variables, using a sample of 343 IPOs on the SHSE 
 Mean of IR 
 
Mean of BHAR60 
 
Squared deviation of IR 
 
Squared deviation of BHAR60 







INTERCEPT 0.4526 0.5059  0.3837 0.3681  0.1384 0.1242  0.1332 0.1068 
 (2.36)
** (2.28)**  (2.17)
** (2.09)**  (1.13) (1.15)  (1.26) (1.24) 
LNSIZE –0.3372 –0.3630  –0.2231 –0.2434  –0.0760 –0.0881  –0.0602 –0.0653 
 (–2.03)
** (–2.05)**  (–1.90)
* (–1.86)*  (–1.83)
* (–1.81)*  (–1.76)
* (–1.85)* 
TECH –0.1208 –0.1388  –0.1642 –0.1785  –0.0795 –0.0798  –0.0642 –0.0624 
 (–1.35) (–1.45)  (–1.56) (–1.59)  (–0.69) (–0.71)  (–0.52) (–0.47) 
STATE –0.6647 –0.6933  –0.6077 –0.5126  –0.0521 –0.0538  –0.0393 –0.0341 
 (–0.55) (–0.52)  (–0.73) (–0.75)  (–1.08) (–1.07)  (–1.15) (–1.02) 
REG 0.2096 0.2159  0.1761 0.1720  0.0621 0.0559  0.0363 0.0376 
 (1.76)* (1.83)*  (1.74)* (1.67)*  (1.91)* (1.74)*  (1.67)* (1.74)* 
BB 0.6769 0.6067  0.4496 0.5357  0.1283 0.1321  0.0870 0.0858 
 (2.14)
** (2.03)**  (2.21)
** (2.24)**  (2.03)
** (2.09)**  (2.06)
** (2.00)** 
SMP 0.4740 0.4910  0.3185 0.3820  0.2149 0.2812  0.1741 0.1718 
 (1.50) (1.40)  (1.44) (1.29)  (1.32) (1.13)  (0.88) (0.76) 
MktRet_3w 2.7330   2.8768   1.7392   1.5682  
 (3.06)
***   (3.27)
***   (2.51)
**   (2.37)
**  
MktRet_3w×BB  3.3460   3.0323   1.8109   1.8718 
  (2.31)
**   (2.20)
**   (2.14)
**   (2.08)
** 
MktRet_3w×OFP  2.3103   2.1991   1.4399   1.3474 
  (2.11)
**   (2.03)
**   (1.81)
*   (1.75)
* 
MktRet_3w×SMP  1.7107   1.4767   0.3266   0.2791 
  (1.55)   (1.45)   (0.95)   (0.86) 
MktVol_1m 3.4287   3.2494   2.0199   1.8222  
 (2.42)
**   (2.16)
**   (2.30)
**   (2.20)
**  
MktVol_1m×BB  3.3202   2.6959   0.9888   0.8733 
  (2.75)
***   (2.62)
***   (2.43)
**   (2.39)
** 
MktVol_1m×OFP  2.5552   2.3275   0.6018   0.4568 
  (2.37)
**   (2.22)
**   (1.77)
*   (1.68)
* 
MktVol_1m×SMP  1.6884   1.5548   0.1955   0.1707 
  (1.55)   (1.49)   (1.29)   (1.02) 
YEAR YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 







This table presents the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions explaining the mean and squared deviation of market-adjusted 
initial returns (IR) and three-month BHARs (BHAR60) with the use of 343 IPOs on the SHSE over the period April 2001 to October 
2012. A total of three IPOs using bookbuilding plus secondary market proportional offering (BS) are excluded in the regression 
analysis due to the very limited sample. IR of each IPO on the SHSE or SZSE is measured by the percentage difference between 
the first trading day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, 
respectively. BHAR60 is measured as the market-adjusted three-month BHR as shown in Table 3. The squared deviations of IR 
and BHAR60 employed in Regressions (28–31) are constructed as the squared residuals from Regressions (24–27), respectively. 
The regression model is presented as follows: 
𝐼𝑅 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅60 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤
× 𝑂𝐹𝑃 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡_3𝑤 × 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚 × 𝑂𝐹𝑃 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙_1𝑚
× 𝑆𝑀𝑃 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀, 
where the firm-specific control variables of LNSIZE, TECH, EXG, STATE, REG; dummy variables of issuing mechanisms of BB 
and SMP, market condition variables of MktRet_3w and MktVol_1m, and indicator variables of YEAR and INDUSTRY are as defined 
in Table 4. The intercept term captures the effect of online fixed price offering (OFP). The interaction variables of MktRet_3w×BB, 
MktRet_3w×OFP, MktRet_3w×SMP, MktVol_1m×BB, MktVol_1m×OFP, and MktVol_1m×SMP are as defined in Table 5. White 







Figure 1 IPO underpricing and market performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2008 
The level of IPO underpricing is measured as the adjusted average initial return, the percentage difference between the first trading 
day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. 
The FTSE China A50 Index is a real-time, tradable index comprising the largest 50 A-Shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE by full 




















































Figure 2 IPO underpricing and variance of initial returns of IPOs in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2008 
The level of IPO underpricing is measured as the adjusted average initial return, the percentage difference between the first trading 
day closing price and offering price, relative to the contemporaneous return on the SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index, respectively. 
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